Acceptable Policing (Part one)
9.1 One Independent Commission on Policing made a comment which this Inquiry would wholeheartedly endorse. The comment was as follows: ”No one who believes in an open society and the Rule of Law can be neutral as between democracy and violence, the protection of human rights and their abuse, the recognition of the dignity of every individual and its denial”. These values, it seems to this Inquiry, are fundamental to democratic progress towards a society that is free and open. Within such values the police must operate. To be able to do that it is essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and co-operative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms. Those structures and arrangements must be capable of maintaining law and order, including responding to public order problems, otherwise the police will fail to win the confidence and acceptance of the community it polices,
9.2 The focus of the policing response on 3 October, 2006, was the protection of the National Assembly and the dispersal of any illegal gathering. The resources deployed by the Commissioner appear to have contributed to aggravating the situation due to a heavy handed intervention by the Special Support Unit. The objectives of protecting the Assembly and dispersing the crowd were, it appears, being successfully achieved by Regular Police. There was no evidence of violence by the crowd prior to the intervention of the SSU. Furthermore, the refusal by the crowd to disperse, of itself, would not justify the heavy handed approach adopted by the SSU.
9.3 The Regular Police appeared to have had the situation under control and there was no serious threat to public order or a serious impediment to the flow of traffic until the intervention of the SSU.
9.4 The evidence shows that there was no communication between Superintendent Roucou and Superintendent Beauchamp at a critical point in time when dispersal negotiations were being finalised.
9.5 The order to disperse the crowd appeared to have come from the Commissioner which indicated that there was inadequate communication between his command post and Superintendent Beauchamp. The following critical failures have been identified by the Inquiry in the policing response and deployment tactics applied on 3 October, 2006:-
- Inefficient communications strategy between the Regular Police at the scene, the SSU and Headquarters;
- Unnecessary deployment of the SSU as the Regular Police remained in control of the situation and there was no evidence that public order had broken down prior to their intervention;
- Failure to designate a scene commander in advance of the SSU intervention.
Some Police Forces use, for example, the Gold, Silver and Bronze command structure where Gold Commander has overall charge and he is informed by Silver Commander who has tactical command of the event with the Bronze Commander on site acting as the scene commander.
Recommendation:- For future events a designated command structure should be put in place with an effective communication link between the officers at the scene and at Headquarters. The policing response should be properly co-ordinated, thereby ensuring that the minimum policing deployment is initially utilised to achieve the policing objective.
9.6 There was a major policing failure in that a proportionate and graduated response was not utilised on 3 October, 2006. There are many models available internationally of a graduated response but, as always, models may need to be adapted to suit particular situations.
9.7 The evidence adduced indicates an excessive and unjustified use of force by the SSU. This included inter alia:-
- Unnecessary and excessive use of rubber bullets;
- Unnecessary and excessive use of tear gas;
- Indiscriminate discharge of live rounds;
- Unnecessary, excessive and unjustified use of batons;
- Failure to apply judgemental training;
- Lack of discipline and control of individual officers;
- Failure of command structures of the SSU as a Public Order Unit;
- Failure to treat injured persons.
9.8 As a general approach to policing of public order events, the evidence adduced at the Inquiry clearly supports the view that the deployment of the SSU as it is currently constituted is a wholly unsuitable response to the policing of such events. The command structures of the SSU itself, its lack of interaction with ordinary policing functions and its lack of understanding of community policing makes it highly unsuitable for ordinary public order policing. Its training is heavily focused on physical interventions and the weaponry available to the Unit shows it to be very much a militaristic style unit. The nature of the SSU as it is currently structured would indicate that it may have a role in maintaining State Security in a time of crisis but should not be deployed to deal with ordinary public events. The Inquiry received no evidence of current violent subversion, or immediate threat of it, in the
(Part two next issue)