ESTABLISHED BY INSTRUMENT OF APPOINTMENT SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SEYCHELLES ON 19 JANUARY 2007
PRESIDING JUDGE: JUDGE MICHAEL REILLY
Acceptable Policing (Part two)
Recommendation: - The present SSU should be subsumed into the armed forces of the Republic of the Seychelles, and be deployed only when the regular civil Police Force decides that it is unable to deal with a particular public order crisis and requests the SSU's intervention.
Recommendation:- The public order policing functions should be exercised by regular police officers.
Recommendation:- All police officers should receive appropriate training for policing public events. The training should have an emphasis on negotiations and the implementation of a graduated response, with a particular focus on respect for human rights.
Recommendation: - A Public Order Unit should be established within the regular police consisting of properly trained regular police officers who when not acting as members of the Unit would be conducting normal community policing duties and have a close involvement with the community. Furthermore, this Unit should not be deployed until soft control methods have failed and the situation warrants it. Also, the Unit should reflect the other recommendations in this report regarding training, methods of responding to events and the proportionality of the response to those events. Emphatically it should not be the SSU under another name.
The evidence adduced at the Inquiry indicates a number of failures in the systems of accountability for police action on 3 October, 2006. These extend from failure to account for assets allocated on the day to failure by senior management to identify officers who used excessive force on the day. Notwithstanding the fact that the Commissioner and Superintendent Cecile stated that Police inquiries into the events of the day were shelved after the announcement of the appointment of this Inquiry, it would have been good policing practice to continue to gather evidence of the events and, as a minimum, establish without delay the nature and cause of the injuries to all civilians. If an investigation had been carried out it might have established that criminal proceedings may have been warranted against police officers who used unjustified and excessive force. 9.10 The system of management accountability in the Police Force was inadequate. The particular accountability failures were as follows:- - failure to hold individual officers to account for use of force or assets;
- failure to effect proper arrests on the day;
- failure to explain the “escape” of arrested persons i.e. Mr. Ferrari, Mr. Ramkalawan and others;
- failure to investigate the serious injuries inflicted by the police;
- failure to secure evidence in an expeditious manner;
- failure to mount and/or continue prosecutions;
- failure to conduct criminal investigations into police officers' behaviour;
- failure to apply discipline regulations appropriately;
- failure to account to the community for the police actions on the day.
The most important aspect of the following recommendation is the requirement that the investigation be carried out by an independent person or persons. Acceptable models can be found in many countries.
Recommendation: - A proper system of accountability for police actions with provision for an independent (independent of the police) investigation of alleged wrong doing by police officers should be put in place. The investigation should be carried out by specially trained civilian investigators and supervised by an independent civilian body composed of persons of known ability and independence.
9.11 Commissioner Waye-Hive acknowledged that he was in overall command of all police units through their commanders and answerable to the President of the Republic of the Seychelles.
9.12 The Inquiry accepts Commissioner Waye-Hive's account of his career in the Army of the Seychelles prior to his appointment as Police Commissioner. It is not necessary in this report to detail his experience and training as an army officer.
9.13 As of 3 October, 2006, the Commissioner was a person of limited policing experience, having been appointed Commissioner the previous August.
He had no previous experience of civil policing.
9.14 The evidence adduced at the Inquiry points to a number of critical failures on the part of the Commissioner to deliver a proper policing service on the day.
- his failure to ensure that a proper risk assessment was carried out;
- his failure to consult the two police advisers who were available to him in his office between 1 and 3 October, 2006.
These police advisers had relevant civilian policing experience;
- his decision to deploy the SSU;
- his failure to ensure that all efforts were made to communicate with organisers of the petition-signing event prior to the event;
- his failure to have the use of force by his officers investigated and his failure to have all civilian injuries investigated.
The individual failures by the Commissioner may be explained by his lack of experience of civilian policing. However, the Inquiry is satisfied that the failures identified in this report go far beyond the individual failures of the Commissioner. They reflect endemic defects in the Police Force. The Inquiry recommendations, particularly the establishment of an independent policing board as recommended at paragraph 9.15 of this report, would, if properly implemented, address at least some of those defects.
Recommendation: - The Police Commissioner and his senior management team should have, as a minimum, the following:-
(a) Experience of civilian policing, i.e. policing that is community based;
(b) Have skills in the following:
(i) relevant organisational and personal leadership;
(ii) communications, including community engagement skills;
(iii) planning and development;
(iv) decision making;
(v) delegation.
(c) Have no political affiliations, apart from exercising normal political franchise.
The Police Commissioner should possess the following key competencies:-
(a) Have a deep appreciation of civil policing;
(b) Be competent to develop a police strategy;
(c) Be aware of his role in tactical planning and co-ordination of his Force;
(d) Be able to assume a leadership role in regard to change, standards and motivation;
(e) Be able to manage both the performance of his officers and the resources allocated to him;
(f) To take the lead in the development of human resources and managing working relationships;
(g) To have a perspective and judgment in decision making;
(h) To have an ability in dealing with communications and public relations;
(i) To have the necessary drive to push the Force to achieve the best professional results.
9.15 Because the Police Commissioner reports directly to the President of the Seychelles as Head of Government there is a perception that some policing operational decisions, which ought to be the sole responsibility of the Commissioner, may be tainted by extraneous political considerations.
The evidence of the Commissioner that, on 3 October, 2006, he reported on a half-hourly basis to the Vice-President feeds this perception. This is something that needs to be addressed. The Inquiry would not favour creating another political body e.g. Justice Ministry, Ministry of the Interior, etc. as this would not necessarily improve the situation. The Inquiry would prefer the creation of an independent Board which would stand between the Government and the police. The Police Commissioner while having operational responsibility for the exercise of his functions and those of the Force generally should be publicly accountable to this Board for the management of the Force. He should be required to report to the Board on any issue pertaining to the performance of his functions or those of the Police Force generally, including explaining operational decisions. Any dispute about the respective roles of the Commissioner and the Board should be resolved by the President. The Government would, of course, retain overall responsibility for providing the community with a policing service. This Board should be truly independent and representative of a wide spectrum of the community.
Recommendation: An independent Policing Board should be established
as a buffer between the Government and the Police Force.