More on Commonwealth Election Observers Report

COMMONWEALTH ELECTION OBESERVERS REPORT

After observing the first election in Seychelles in July 1992, following the restoration of the multi-party system, the Commonwealth Observers, issued a comprehensive report. Below we reproduce excerpts of that report which shows just how little has changed in terms of the process of democracy in our country after 14 years. It is ironic that almost the same criticisms and concerns about the process leading to and after election resurfaced in the 2006 Presidential Election.

The (1992) election threw up a number of issues, which by their very nature bore directly on the ultimate freeness and fairness of the entire process. Some were of the sort to be expected in any competitive election; others reflects the peculiarities of Seychelles, the great majority arising from the fact that the election itself was part of a wider process involving a transition from many years of one-party rule to multi-party pluralism. it is also only fair to add that most of these issues seemed to weigh more heavily with the Opposition parties who invariably, raised them with us in the clear expectation that our intervention with the authorities would help to resolve them.

Voters Registration List

In an estimated total population of some 70,000, the authorities had come up with an electorate of 49,975 voters. Some Opposition parties considered this a gross exaggeration. Basing themselves on an update of the 1987 census which put the population of Seychelles at the time at 68,598, they argued that the voting population should have been more like 43,000 and not 49,975, even allowing for births and deaths in the intervening period. In addition, there were allegations that the Voters Registration List contained names of dead people and of foreigners who had either impersonated their way onto the list or who had been registered as voters against the provisions of the law and in the interest of the ruling party. it was also brought to our attention that voters who had registered in one electoral district had been transferred to another apparently without their prior knowledge and consent, thus effectively threatening to disenfranchise them.

The Director of Statistics also offered a credible explanation for the seemingly high number of voters on the Registration List. This List still included some thousands of Seychellois in possession of National Identity Numbers or ID Cards who had gone to live overseas in recent years. Such persons were excluded from official population estimates, which were based on residence in country. Thus the official estimate of 43,276 Seychellois over the age of 18 at mid-1991 did not include those living overseas but still on the Voters Registration List, and did not account for those who have turned 18 in the 12 months since. (Note: the then director of statistics was Hendricks Gappy- now the Electoral Commissioner)

In our view, much of the controversy surrounding the size and disposition of the electorate stems in the main from the fact that a new census is now needed which will settle the controversy over the size of the electorate to the satisfaction of all concerned. We urge the authorities to put this matter in hand at the earliest opportunity.(Since this report was made a full and comprehensive census was carried out in 2002 and, it appears not adjustment was made to the voters list).

Links between Party and State

The issue which loomed largest and which appeared to be of most concern to all the opposition parties was the continuing link between the state and the ruling SPPF. As in all single-party states, the 15 years of SPPF rule had brought about a well-nigh complete fusion of the party and the state. The theory proclaimed it and the practice enforced it. The President’s statement of 3 December 1991 making Seychelles once more a multi-party state should have inaugurated the effective de-linking of the party from the state. In actual fact, at the time of the election to the Constitutional Commission, it did not seem. that much headway had been made to this end. . For example, it was pointed out that shortly before the President’s declaration about the reintroduction of multi-party politics, District Council Elections were held, which had installed SPPF party functionaries in positions of power and influence at the local level. (Note: Today the District Council has been replaced by the DA, who is virtually an SPPF “official” paid for by the State and answerable to a senior member of the Central Committee of the Party posing as a Government Minister).

As in many developing societies, the state in Seychelles is the main employer and this makes the community dependent on those who control it for their jobs, pensions, loans, education, housing and other social facilities. This has placed a disproportionate advantage in the hands of the SPPF leaders and the opposition parties maintain that it has not scrupled to use that advantage to compel political loyalty and support from the community. Many of the Inner and Outer Islands, for example, are under the control of the Island Development Corporation (IDC), the parastatal responsible for the economic exploitation of these distant areas. The control of these islands by a quasi-governmental body in effect gave the SPPF privileged access to the voters living there. By contrast, other parties wishing to campaign in these areas faced considerable difficulties. A number of opposition parties complained to us that permission to visit these islands was almost invariably difficult to secure from the IDC and even when permission had been given, it could just as suddenly be withdrawn.

Conduct of the Security Forces

The Inner and Outer Islands were not the only areas perceived to be the preserve of the SPPF. Of the institutions of the state, the army, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU) (the paramilitary wing of the police force), and the militia (now National Guard) were widely perceived to be particularly close to the present Government and therefore having a stake in its continuation in office. These perceptions seemed to have been reinforced by the command structure in each case and the fact that these institutions came into being under the SPPF Government. The army which did not exist before 1977 had grown to its present strength in the period since then and had come to be seen as one of the privileged institutions in Seychellois society. It says a great deal about the perceived link between the army and the ruling party that all the opposition parties were against soldiers of the Seychelles Defence Forces (SDF) patrolling the streets on polling day or being ferried in military vehicles to polling stations to cast their votes. The clear division between civilian and military responsibility normally found in all modern democracies is absent in Seychelles. The Minister of Finance, the second most senior member of the Cabinet, is also the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces. There is thus a direct operational link between the Cabinet and the military. The potential for abuse in such situations can be considerable. (Note: The Minister of Finance and Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces at that time was James Alix Michel)

The PMU was considered to be even more closely allied to the SPPF Government. In formal terms, it falls under the command of the Commissioner of Police; but it is widely believed that in practice it comes under the direction and control of the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces. In the week before the election, there were many complaints of PMU officers tearing down posters and other propaganda material of the opposition parties. The militia was said to be the most partisan of all the security agencies. Not surprisingly, there were many complaints of intimidation of opposition party supporters by elements of the militia.

Post—Election Security

Many of those we spoke to over the period of our visit had expressed fears of instability should the SPPF lose this election. In particular, they were apprehensive about possible disorder leading to intervention by the army A week before polling day, five opposition parties wrote a joint letter to the British, French, Indian and American Governments to send warships to Seychelles during the election period “to forestall any possibility of a military coup during the elections”.

It is therefore ironic that in the immediate aftermath of an SPPF victory in a free and fair election, those fears of disorder should have been borne out.

The office of the Commonwealth Observer Group was inundated with telephone calls throughout the day on Monday, 27 July, from the leaders and supporters of opposition parties, church representatives and members of the public, who had witnessed both PMU and army personnel arresting and rough-handling opposition party supporters and bystanders. Many people were detained at the Central Police Station in Victoria and also at other district police stations. The army had intervened in controlling what appeared to be. a routine law and order situation which could have been dealt with by the civilian police.

In a meeting with President Rene on 28 July, the Chairman stressed the Group’s disappointment that these civil disturbances should have occurred after a peaceful and successful polling day, and that, it should not have been necessary for the army to become involved. The President took note of our representations and undertook to enquire into the matter further. His initial information was that the police (through the PMU) had requested the army’s assistance to control civil disturbance which, if left unattended, could have become much worse. We were later informed that all those detained had been released.

In the light of these events, we again strongly urge restraint by the law enforcement and security agencies, particularly during the fragile transition period, and the strengthening of the civilian police.